Wikileaks: manejo político de la SBS entrega de información a los EE. UU.
Filtraban información de Nadine Heredia, esposa de Ollanta Humala
Un nuevo documento de Wikileaks revela que la Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros (SBS) obedece a un manejo político en el delicado asunto de la información sobre lavado de activos y movimiento bancario de las personas. Además, los Estados Unidos, a través de su embajada el Lima, espían a esta institución recibiendo información de agentes peruanos.
Felipe Tam Fox |
Un nuevo documento de Wikileaks revela que la Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros (SBS) obedece a un manejo político en el delicado asunto de la información sobre lavado de activos y movimiento bancario de las personas. Además, los Estados Unidos, a través de su embajada el Lima, espían a esta institución recibiendo información de agentes peruanos.
Como si el Perú fuese un virreinato de los Estados Unidos, una serie de “soplones” corren a llevar información a la embajada, que dando oídos a estos sujetos los alienta en sus oscuras actividades. En el caso de la SBS, un sujeto lleva a la embajada detalles sobre el manejo de la SBS, institución poseedora de información secreta y que debería guardar secreto y confidencialidad.
La Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (UIF) de la SBS, clave en la lucha contra el lavado de activos, dice el documento, revela sus intimidades a la embajada. Entre otros, informa sobre la falta de colaboración de la Sunat, los bancos, y del Ministerio Público, no tiene autonomía y está sujeta al poder político del gobierno aprista.
Los cables confidenciales 237473 (del 1 de diciembre del 2009) y 246091 (del 28 de enero del 2010) , publicados por El Comercio, indican que los jefes de esta institución, Silvia Wuan Almandós (de junio del 2007 a febrero del 2009) y Ramón Saldívar Bocángel (de febrero a diciembre del 2009), fueron retirados de sus puestos “por trabajar muy rápido” o “por acercarse demasiado a grandes casos” en la gestión de su jefe, el superintendente de Banca y Seguros Felipe Tam Fox, nombrado en 2007.
Wuan dejó su puesto —según contactos del NAS [Narcotics Affairs Section, una entidad de lucha antidrogas distinta a la DEA] en el Ministerio Público, en la policía y en otros lugares— por una débil actuación, aunque ella dijo públicamente que fue presionada a renunciar porque se “había acercado demasiado a descubrir grandes casos”, dice el cable 237473, que hace un recuento de la UIF entre el 2008 y el 2009.
Sobre Saldívar Bocángel, el documento dice que se reunió con un oficial de la NAS en noviembre del 2009, lo cual originó el cable 237473. En esta cita Saldívar acusó a Tam, a quien vinculó con el Apra, de presuntas irregularidades.
Nadine Heredia
Bajo el subtítulo “Filtración de información financiera” se señala: “Saldívar dijo al oficial de NAS que [Tam] está filtrando información importante de reportes de inteligencia financiera a organismos políticos y a la prensa… dijo que sospecha que [este último] ha filtrado información sensible acerca de casos de perfil alto por razones políticas, producto de su cercana conexión con el presidente Alan García y su partido político”. Saldívar reveló que una de las filtraciones corresponde a información financiera de Nadine Heredia, esposa de Ollanta Humala.
El cable indica que a Tam no le interesaría mucho pedir al sistema bancario su colaboración en la lucha contra el lavado de activos y que estas empresas tampoco desean colaborar.
Saldívar narró ser víctima de un manejo sospechoso de la SBS, pues a cuatro meses de su gestión como director de la UIF, Tam le dijo que estaba “trabajando muy rápido” y que el superintendente de Banca y Seguros se resiste a presionar a los bancos para que acaten las órdenes de congelamiento de cuentas [de dinero sucio].
Scotiabank y el Commercial Bank
Entre las instituciones internacionales que no colaboraban Saldívar mencionó al Scotiabank, que no tenía intención de informar a la UIF sobre lo relacionado a fraude fiscal y wl Commercial Bank, que informó a Saldívar que” no reportarían nada sobre dinero falsificado”. El cable que omite el nombre del tercer banco.
Saldívar dijo que la UIF no es una institución completamente autónoma y que se “siente frustrado por los obstáculos legales y burocráticos del sistema judicial en casos de lavado, así como por todo el papeleo con el Ministerio Público (especialmente con la fiscal de la Nación) y con la Sunat, que se rehúsa a compartir información y se esconde detrás de leyes de confidencialidad de los impuestos por una cuestión de celo”.
Saldívar, ex jefe de la UIF, renunció al cargo al día siguiente de la elaboración del cable confidencial.
Los cables:
La Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (UIF) de la SBS, clave en la lucha contra el lavado de activos, dice el documento, revela sus intimidades a la embajada. Entre otros, informa sobre la falta de colaboración de la Sunat, los bancos, y del Ministerio Público, no tiene autonomía y está sujeta al poder político del gobierno aprista.
Los cables confidenciales 237473 (del 1 de diciembre del 2009) y 246091 (del 28 de enero del 2010) , publicados por El Comercio, indican que los jefes de esta institución, Silvia Wuan Almandós (de junio del 2007 a febrero del 2009) y Ramón Saldívar Bocángel (de febrero a diciembre del 2009), fueron retirados de sus puestos “por trabajar muy rápido” o “por acercarse demasiado a grandes casos” en la gestión de su jefe, el superintendente de Banca y Seguros Felipe Tam Fox, nombrado en 2007.
Wuan dejó su puesto —según contactos del NAS [Narcotics Affairs Section, una entidad de lucha antidrogas distinta a la DEA] en el Ministerio Público, en la policía y en otros lugares— por una débil actuación, aunque ella dijo públicamente que fue presionada a renunciar porque se “había acercado demasiado a descubrir grandes casos”, dice el cable 237473, que hace un recuento de la UIF entre el 2008 y el 2009.
Sobre Saldívar Bocángel, el documento dice que se reunió con un oficial de la NAS en noviembre del 2009, lo cual originó el cable 237473. En esta cita Saldívar acusó a Tam, a quien vinculó con el Apra, de presuntas irregularidades.
Nadine Heredia
Bajo el subtítulo “Filtración de información financiera” se señala: “Saldívar dijo al oficial de NAS que [Tam] está filtrando información importante de reportes de inteligencia financiera a organismos políticos y a la prensa… dijo que sospecha que [este último] ha filtrado información sensible acerca de casos de perfil alto por razones políticas, producto de su cercana conexión con el presidente Alan García y su partido político”. Saldívar reveló que una de las filtraciones corresponde a información financiera de Nadine Heredia, esposa de Ollanta Humala.
El cable indica que a Tam no le interesaría mucho pedir al sistema bancario su colaboración en la lucha contra el lavado de activos y que estas empresas tampoco desean colaborar.
Saldívar narró ser víctima de un manejo sospechoso de la SBS, pues a cuatro meses de su gestión como director de la UIF, Tam le dijo que estaba “trabajando muy rápido” y que el superintendente de Banca y Seguros se resiste a presionar a los bancos para que acaten las órdenes de congelamiento de cuentas [de dinero sucio].
Scotiabank y el Commercial Bank
Entre las instituciones internacionales que no colaboraban Saldívar mencionó al Scotiabank, que no tenía intención de informar a la UIF sobre lo relacionado a fraude fiscal y wl Commercial Bank, que informó a Saldívar que” no reportarían nada sobre dinero falsificado”. El cable que omite el nombre del tercer banco.
Saldívar dijo que la UIF no es una institución completamente autónoma y que se “siente frustrado por los obstáculos legales y burocráticos del sistema judicial en casos de lavado, así como por todo el papeleo con el Ministerio Público (especialmente con la fiscal de la Nación) y con la Sunat, que se rehúsa a compartir información y se esconde detrás de leyes de confidencialidad de los impuestos por una cuestión de celo”.
Saldívar, ex jefe de la UIF, renunció al cargo al día siguiente de la elaboración del cable confidencial.
Los cables:
Cable de Wikileaks revela peligrosas infidencias en SBS
id: 237473
date: 12/1/2009 19:27
refid: 09LIMA1675
origin: Embassy Lima
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001675
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SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/01
TAGS: EFIN, EINT, PTER, SNAR, PE, KTFN, DEA, TRSY
SUBJECT: Peru’s Financial Intelligence Unit- Reinvigorated
CLASSIFIED BY: Alexandra Z. Tenny, NAS Programs Officer, State, NAS;
REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Peru’s Financial Intelligence Unit – Reinvigorated
1. (C) Summary: The Peruvian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU),
under new management since February 2009, has shown renewed vigor
as demonstrated by the exponential increase in the number of
intelligence reports entering the judicial system compared to 2008.
Based on these cases, the FIU estimates that more than three
billion USD moved through the Peruvian economy illegally in 2009,
more than 80 percent as a result of drug trafficking. The new FIU
Director, however, is in conflict with his boss, the Superintendent
of Banks. The FIU receives strong support from the Prime Minister’s
office which is contemplating legislation to make the FIU fully
autonomous similar to the Colombian model. End Summary.
—————————
The FIU – a Primer
—————————
2. (C) The FIU, created in 2002, functioned under several
jurisdictions – including the Prime Minister’s office, the Public
Ministry, and the Finance Ministry – until 2007, when it came under
the authority of the Superintendent of Banking, Insurance, and
Private Pension funds (SBS). In addition to responsibility for
analysis, prevention, and supervision, the FIU has a regulatory
role. It proposes strategies and polices to the Superintendent on
prevention and detection of asset laundering and terrorist
financing; drafts regulations on asset laundering and terrorist
financing; and coordinates with other agencies in developing
regulations. The FIU receives and analyzes Suspicious Transaction
Reports (STRs), may request additional information relevant to
cases or operations related to money laundering or terrorist
financing, provides Financial Intelligence Reports (FIR) to the
Public Prosecutor’s Office, participates and/or requests joint
investigations, and coordinates with foreign FIUs and entities.
Finally, the FIU supervises the system of prevention of asset
laundering and has the authority to sanction entities for
non-compliance with regulations or deficiencies in their business
to prevent the laundering of assets.
—————————-
Under New Management
——————————
3. (C) In 2008, Peru’s Financial Intelligence Unit produced
Financial Intelligence Reports (FIR) for the Public Prosecutor
resulting in four cases entering the judicial system. Then-FIU
head Sylvia Wong stepped down from her position at the end of 2008
and in February 2009, Enrique Saldivar was appointed Director of
the FIU. The speculation at the time of her departure on the part
of NASOff contacts in the Public Ministry, Peruvian National
Police, and other places was that she had been removed for lack of
performance, though she has publicly claimed she was pressured into
stepping down because she “got too close” to uncovering “big
cases.”
4. (U) As of February 2009, FIU has been under the leadership of
Ramon Enrique Saldivar Bocangel. Most recently having served as
advisor to the President of the Supreme Court, he has also been the
head of the Prime Minister’s National Office of Electronic
Government and Information. Prior to these positions, Saldivar
worked in the private sector, including five years with Microsoft.
He holds multiple degrees from the best universities in Lima in
Economics and Business Administration and has attended the
Microsoft Latin American Executive Training Program in Bogota.
——————————-
FIU Progress in 2009
——————————-
5. (C) Of the 7,710 suspicious activity reports examined by FIU
analysts in 2009, 781 resulted in financial intelligence reports
sent to the Public Ministry for further processing and
investigation. Based on these 781 intelligence reports, the FIU
concludes more than 3 billion USD moved illegally through Peru’s
financial sector in 2009. 83 percent of this amount, according to
the FIU, is related to drug trafficking. The other 17 percent is
reportedly related to fiscal fraud, corruption and illegal gun
dealing. Currently, 308 of these intelligence reports are at
various stages of investigation and prosecution in the legal system – as compared to four cases in 2008. The FIU also reports tracking
cases similar to that of an OFAC-designated Al-Qaida element moving
money from Europe through Lima and on to India. Asked if this
Al-Qaida case was the first of its kind or they had seen similar
cases before, Saldivar told NASOff that they see about one case a
month.
——————————-
Challenges to the FIU
——————————-
6. (C) Saldivar told NASOff he often becomes frustrated by the
legal and bureaucratic obstacles encountered when pushing money
laundering cases through the judicial system. Any information
sharing between the FIU and other Peruvian entities involves a
paper intensive process through the Public Ministry (Attorney
General’s Office). The FIU must contend, he said, with
institutions such as the Peruvian tax agency (SUNAT), which refuses
to share information, not because it is forbidden by law, but
because SUNAT does not believe FIU has safeguards to protect the
information. Saldivar argues that this is not the case and claims
it is more an issue of institutional jealousy than real security
concern. Furthermore, he asserted, SUNAT often hides behind tax
confidentiality laws although the tax code establishes exceptions
in cases typically investigated by the FIU. The FIU is receiving
strong support from the Prime Minister’s Office, according to
Saldivar. Legislation to make the FIU fully autonomous similar to
the Colombian model, is being considered, he said. Saldivar did
not know, however, when this legislation would be introduced.
7. (C) According to Saldivar, anti-money laundering efforts in Peru
are hindered by several factors. He said, for example, there are
too many agents working on different aspects related to money
laundering and terrorist financing and their related offences.
Additionally, while the FIU is the coordinating body for anti-money
laundering and terrorist financing issues, the current legal
structure restricts inter-agency collaboration and information
sharing, including access to information such as tax and banking
records. Finally, Saldivar told NASOff that his own boss, the
Superintendent of Banks, is reluctant to push the banking sector in
terms of compliance. Currently, though the major banks have
complied with orders to freeze accounts, they are under no
obligation to comply quickly, according to Saldivar.
8. (C) Saldivar confided in NASOff that when he first began as the
Director of the FIU he met with the management of each of the major
international and Peruvian banks. He said he was rather taken
aback when the three largest international banks told him they had
no intention of cooperating with him. Scotia Bank, Saldivar said,
told him they had no intention of reporting to FIU anything related
to fiscal fraud and Commercial Bank informed him they would not
report to the FIU on counterfeit currency.
——————————————-
Leaking Financial Information
——————————————-
9. (C) Saldivar told NASOff he believes that the Banking
Superintendent is leaking sensitive information from FIRs to
political entities and the press. Both the Banking Superintendent
and Saldivar are being sued personally by Peru’s Nationalist Party
because of an FIU investigation into one of its leaders. Saldivar
said he suspects that the Superintendent has leaked sensitive
information on this and other high profile cases for political
reasons due to his close connection with President Garcia and his
political party.
———-
Comment
———-
10. (C) Saldivar appeared stressed and worried when
discussing the issue of the leak and shared with NASOFF that four
months into his tenure as Director, he was told by the
Superintendent’s chief advisor that he was “working too quickly.”
The numbers speak for themselves in terms of the FIU’s performance
in 2009 as compared to 2008 primarily due to Saldivar’s leadership.
The FIU staff who less than six months ago reported to NASOff low
morale now reports a renewed energy in their work and excitement
for the vision of the new leadership. However, Saldivar’s tenure
is in question, and he feels he is being prevented by other
officials from fully realizing the FIU’s potential. Saldivar has
demonstrated results and NAS will continue to support the FIU’s
work.
MCKINLEY
Cable de Wikileaks revela peligrosas infidencias en SBS (2)
id: 246091
date: 1/28/2010 20:52
refid: 10LIMA99
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000099
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/28
TAGS: ASEC, EFIN, SNAR, PE, KCRM, KTFN
SUBJECT: Peruvian Banking Superintendent Talks about Future of FIU
and GAFISUD Priorities
CLASSIFIED BY: kathy schleigh, OMS, State, NAS; REASON: 1.4(B)
Peruvian Banking Superintendent Talks about Future of FIU and
GAFISUD Priorities
1. (SBU) Summary: Peru’s Superintendent of Banking Felipe outlined
his vision for the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) moving forward
and discussed his priorities as the new chairman of GAFISUD (spell
out first usage) in a January 22 meeting with Emboffs. Accompanied
by International Affairs Manager Jorge Yumi, and new FIU Director
Sergio Espinosa, Tam emphasized that the investigative priorities
for the FIU remain unchanged despite the recent change in
leadership and that they are looking forward to continued
cooperation with the U.S. Embassy. Tam said he will continue to
support proposed legislation to strengthen anti-money laundering
investigations and modernize the FIU as well as push at the highest
levels to ensure that anti-money laundering is a priority in the
GOP. End
Summary.
The FIU – Enrique Salvidar Steps Down, New Head Appointed
2. (SBU) On December 2nd, Enrique Salvidar resigned his position as
head of the FIU citing personal and family reasons. At the time,
there was intense speculation that he had stepped down at the
request of Superintendent of Banking Felipe Tam as a result of an
information leak scandal (REF A). No formal charges have been filed
against Salvidar or Tam, but the Public Ministry is looking into
the matter and how to ensure better control of investigative
information. On December 8th, Sergio Espinosa was appointed as the
new FIU Director. No other staff changes have occurred – the Deputy
Director remains in place as do the section heads. For the time
being, Espinosa will be wearing two hats as he is also head of
Superintendency of Banking’s (SBS) legal department. Espinosa has
worked in the SBS for over 15 years in various departments.
FIU – Looking Forward
3. (U) Tam explained that the FIU will be implementing a new
software system that will allow the FIU to receive Suspicious
Activity Reports (SARs) electronically and is looking to
restructure the organization to give more authority to the FIU
Director. Tam is also looking to relocate the FIU offices to a
larger, more secure building. When asked about his plans for
strengthening the day-to-day work of the FIU, Tam said he is
pushing proposed legislation in Congress that would grant FIU
access to any type of financial information such as banking and tax
information that is currently considered secret or restricted. Tam
and Espinosa both said the priorities and the training needs of the
FIU remain unchanged and they expect things to move forward
smoothly, despite the leadership change. Tam’s View on Money
Laundering in Peru
4. (C) Tam feels that the highest levels of the GOP need to have a
deeper understanding of the connections between money laundering
and drug trafficking. He also acknowledged that the money exchange
houses are a black hole in the FIU’s understanding of how money
moves through the Peruvian financial sector. (NOTE: most of the
money exchange houses operate in the informal sector and thus there
is little-to-no official reporting to the FIU, though it is legally
required). It is Tam’s opinion that although addressing the role
of exchange houses is difficult, it is not impossible because,
according to Tam, all the money must go through a bank at some
point. Tam also said that there needs to be more coordination on
the gaming sector between the SBS and the Ministry of Tourism (REF
B). He feels that if they can get at the gaming sector, the money
exchange houses, and the construction sector, they will have
tackled the greatest part of the money laundering problem in Peru.
5. (C) Tam also explained the challenges in working with the Public
Ministry. Espinosa agreed and said they are working to maintain
open communication with the prosecutors who work money laundering
cases. One change they will be making this year, at the request of
the Public Ministry, is that the FIU will begin filtering Financial
Intelligence Reports (FIR) sent to the Prosecutor’s Office for
further investigation. The Public Ministry has asked that, rather
than sending everything over, the FIU prioritize and focus on
prosecutable cases. This is a significant change from the past
modus operandi because it will give the FIU more authority and
ability to prioritize cases. Tam said that one of his personal
challenges with the Public Ministry is convincing the attorney
general that anti-money laundering work is priority work across the
board and especially in counter narcotics. Currently, the SBS pays
salaries for two financial analysts in the Public Ministry and has
an agreement with the Magistrates Academy to support anti-money
laundering and terrorist financing courses. Tam said his vision is
to advance anti-money laundering work in Peru more so than ever
before.
Priorities for GAFISUD
6. (SBU) With Peru chairing GAFISUD this year, Tam said his
priorities include improving the professionalism of the GAFISUD
Secretariat and supporting the intentions of Costa Rica and Panama
to join GAFISUD. At the GAFISUD meeting in July, Tam said, he plans
to discuss the inclusion of Costa Rica and Panama as well as the
need to develop a series of meetings with Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Paraguay which are struggling to implement the 40+9 recommendations
established by GAFI-FATF (Financial Action Task Force) and adopted
by GAFISUD. Tam said he is also looking to push micro-finance as a
major tool for GAFISUD countries to address the informal sectors –
a serious issue in Peru. Tam believes that by reducing the informal
sector, governments can reduce avenues of money laundering,
increase access to credit for lower income individuals and families
and better regulate the financial sector.
National Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing System
7. (SBU) Tam explained that another of his top priorities for the
SBS is to launch a national anti-money laundering and terrorist
financing system (SILAFIT), an interagency task force led by the
Ministry of Economy and Finance with the SBS as the Technical
Secretariat. Tam said there is political support for this idea and
the Minister has agreed in principle to the SILAFIT structure.
However, Tam feels that international support, especially from the
U.S., would help with this priority.
Comment
8. (SBU) The transition of leadership in the FIU seems to be going
smoothly and post is encouraged by the commitment of Espinosa to
maintain the FIU priorities developed under Salvidar. Tam expressed
several times his hope that NAS will continue with cooperation and
assistance to the FIU and said he may be looking to the U.S.
Embassy for support on policy issues related to anti-money
laundering. We will continue to support the FIU and seek ways
encourage improvements in prosecutions and convictions of money
launderers.
McKinley